First Person Heideggerian Philosophy: The Prioritization of Concerns

[Anthony Crifasi]

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
> 
>  >Someone who does not understand the philosophical prioritization of
>  >Them over *me* will fail to understand that the question "What am I" is
>  >NOT about what we most fundamentally are at all, since "I" am most
>  >fundamentally Them, not me. In other words, they will think that the
>  >question, "What am I?" is philosophically important, when it really
>  >isn't.
> 
> is this a prediction that can be tested by empirical means?
> 
> let's say that I do not understand the philosophical prioritization of
> Them over *me*. I most certainly do not give it to have the significance
> you give it; and, perhaps, this is due to not really understanding this
> point you are raising. and let's say further that you correctly
> understand the philosophical prioritization of Them over *me*.
> 
> how does that difference in viewpoint affect the inquiry into the
> structure of the human? could it vary by opinion? are you suggesting
> that someone who holds the opinion you have is constructed of a body,
> the phenomenological experiencer and an immaterial mind while someone
> who disagrees with you lacks the immaterial mind component?

No, it has nothing to do with immateriality or materiality. The fact 
that you even asked that question at this point indicates that you are 
still seriously misunderstanding even the fundamentals of Heideggerian 
philosophy, which means that we *must* concentrate on the other line of 
argument first - the inevitable self-destruction of beginning with the 
question, What am I.

> is there any possible way for the construction of the human to be
> dependent on having the correct understanding of philosophical
> prioritizations?
> 
> would you at least agree that the structure of a human is what it is
> irregardless of differences of race, ethnic affiliation, gender or
> opinions about philosophical prioritizations?

Again, the fact that you think that the question of "the structure of a 
human" could be independent of the question of "philosophical 
prioritizations" indicates serious fundamental misunderstandings of the 
philosophical issues involved. For that reason, let's *exclusively* 
concentrate on the side of the argument that I think motivated Heidegger 
to come with his philosophical reprioritization in the first place - 
namely, the internal self-destruction of your line of analysis of human 
being. You can't critique Heidegger's notion of Dasein (and it can be 
critiqued) until you understand it, and you clearly don't yet.

By the way, I don't think that's really your fault, first because 
Heidegger's phenomenology begins with what is philosophically 
counterintuitive to us - namely, the philosophical analysis of our 
PRE-analytical ways of encountering beings, without imposing analytical 
categories. It takes a long time for a mind trained in traditional 
analytical philosophy to learn to do that - even Husserl ended up 
imposing analytical categories on our pre-analytical encounters when he 
tried it. Secondly, Heidegger scholars are notoriously bad at explaining 
his philosophy clearly, partly due to the aforementioned 
counterintuitive aspect of his starting point.

So let's leave Heidegger aside for the moment and concentrate on why I 
think your line of questioning would lead straight to either the 
destruction of the self (Hume) or the reduction of Others into the self 
(Husserl). This WILL inevitably lead to why Heidegger says what he says.

>  >Someone who does not understand the philosophical prioritization of
>  >Them over *me* will doom philosophy to skepticism, idealism, and
>  >solipsism, because the question "What am I?" immediately raises the
>  >question of how I (known first) know about Them (known after me) at
>  >all. Every attempt to philosophically answer the latter question so far
>  >has ended up either dissolving Me (Hume) or dissolving Them into Me
>  >(Husserl).
> 
> this sounds like an empirically testable claim concerning the domino
> theory of philosophy.
> 
> asking 'what is the structure of a human?' --> asking 'how I know about
> them?' --> (Hume's outcome v Husserl's outcome).
> 
> I deny that asking 'what is the structure of a human?' somehow requires
> me to ask 'how I know about them?' in point of fact I don't ask the
> latter question. I just accept that there are other humans. I don't
> worry about how I know this; but, obviously, I avoid the quagmire of SIS
> --- contrary to your prediction of doom and gloom.

I'm a bit puzzled by the fact that you think you can actually reply this 
way and still consider yourself a philosopher. It's certainly a reply, 
but hardly a *philosophical* reply, to just accept something and not ask 
questions about it. With your focus on Descartes, you should know that 
better than anyone. Descartes' method begins by questioning the very 
thing that you refuse to question above - in fact, that's how he even 
reaches the Cogito in the first place. So if you're actually going to 
reply this way and just make assumptions about the world, brain, body 
and such, you should probably take your inquiry about the "I" to a 
psychology list instead of a philosophy list.

> consequently, I don't even reach the point where you say I must arrive
> at either Hume's outcome or Husserl's outcome. nevertheless, as an
> aside, I deny that you've accurately described Hume's outcome. logically
> all he proved was that the I-2 can not discover the I-3 (if there is an
> I-3 at all) by sorting thru the contents of awareness. the possibility
> that there might be some other means of discovery to be evaluated.

Well, you are the one asking for an "empirically testable claim," aren't 
you? That's all Hume is doing.

> Einstein was much more circumspect in reviewing the failure of the
> Michaelson-Morley experiment. he declined to conclude that there was no
> either; and, merely concluded that the ether, if it existed at all,
> could not be detected. philosophers might well take a lesson from
> Einstein.

Again, you are the one who asked whether my claims were "empirically 
testable," not me. If that's your criterion, then Hume's your man.