7X Polanik clips out argument

Tue May 6 07:35:29 EDT 2008

Googlers note: Polanik has resumed his chronic habit of leaving out my 
arguments after claiming I never gave them, and then ignoring my 
citations of those previous arguments. Therefore, as before, until he 
addresses every item in the arguments I cite, this conversation is over. 
Here are the my two citations of past answers that he claimed I never gave:

> From now on, Joseph, please give links (as do I) to the archived posts that you quote, so that anyone may see how I replied to them.
>  
> On 5/5/08, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik at nc.rr.com> wrote:
>  
> 
>     Schizo-Epistemology: Self-Identity for All Reality Types?
> 
>     The Crifasi Argument:
> 
>     >1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
>     >that I exist.
> 
>     >2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>     >remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
> 
>     >3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
>     >all my perceptions.
> 
>     >4. Therefore, I don't know that I exist.
> 
>     >5. Therefore I don't know that predicates are attributable to me.
> 
>     >Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.
> 
>     you claim that you have a 'FURTHER' argument for the proposition 'I
>     remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions'. according to you
>     this proposition (your original premise 1) is true because "Denying that
>     would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
>     pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
>     born, I am now X, I will die)."
> 
>     you've never addressed my challenge to your assumption that your first
>     person statements support your conclusion irregardless of the reality
>     type of the referent of 'I'. I summarize that argument here.
> 
>     [Context]:
> 
>     there was some discussion of how you knew that the argument based on
>     your set of first person statements (I was born, I am now X, I will die)
>     applied to the various reality types that 'I' might refer to; and, on
>     2008-03-29, you replied that your argument applied to "any of them".
> 
>     I then presented two counterarguments. your reply to the first was
>     inadequate and evasive; and, you ignored the second altogether. let us
>     review these
> 
>     1. The Self-Refuting Conclusion
> 
>     [JP, 2008-03-29]:
> 
>     okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don't
>     have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
>     the I that draws the conclusion, 'I have not proven by evidence based
>     logical deduction that I am not nothing'.
> 
>     now all we have to decide is whether 'the Nothing' (as defined by
>     Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>     how about it, Anthony, is 'the Nothing' able to assert 'I have not
>     proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing'?
> 
>     if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
>     conclusion may legitimately continue, 'it is now a fact that I have just
>     asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
>     is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing'.
> 
>     how about it, Professor? is Heidegger's 'Nothing' able to assert 'I have
>     not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing'?
> 
>  
> This was my answer to the above post:
>  
> http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/joseph-polanik-the-game-player-ii
>  
> Please address every item in my reply without clipping anything out. And please link your quotes from now on. A simple google search for a distinctive phrase in the text will give you the link.
> 
>     2. Testing Claims Against Specific Reality Types
> 
>     [JP, 2008-04-02]:
> 
>     you are claiming that your argument remains true when applied to an I of
>     any reality type. in a sense, you've made the word/symbol 'I' into a
>     variable which ranges over a certain set of proposed reality types. you
>     say the argument "covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1
>     and I-3 are not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal".
> 
>     so, you've undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
>     merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
>     chosen reality type.
> 
>     ok. I choose the I-3.
> 
>     to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
>     prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
>     that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
>     is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
> 
>     [NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
>     I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
>     or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
> 
>     go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
>     you may have for the proposition that "I-3 remain self-identical
>     throughout all my perceptions"
> 
>     at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
>     that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
>     conclude 'I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
>     am not nothing'.
> 
>     [JP (new material)]:
> 
>     Anthony, you've never addressed the question raised by your claim that
>     your argument applied to all reality types:
> 
> 
>     in the case of the I-3, how do you know either:
> 
>     1. that there is no I-3; or,
> 
>     2. that there is an I-3 and that it is self-identical throughout all its
>     perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so
>     on?
> 
>  
> My response to the above, as well as your latter question, is here:
>  
> http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033822.html
>  
> We are now in the midst of arguing about my reply, regarding the identity of the first person pronoun and its relationship to the identity of the referent. Please link your quotes from now on (as do I) so that you do not miss my replies and mischaracterize me as not replying again.

Until you address each and every item in those two citations, without 
clipping anything out, this conversation is over.

Nor did he address this argument:

> On 5/5/08, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik at nc.rr.com> wrote:
>  
> 
>     Anthony Crifasi wrote:
> 
>     >your posts since then support a reconstruction of your argument as
>     >follows:
> 
>     >>>* it is a fact that, in english, the first-person singular pronoun is
>     >>>now and has for centuries been spelled 'I'.
> 
>     >>>* it is a fact that a given person uses 'I' for self-referencing at
>     >>various points in time.
> 
>     >>>* these two facts must have an explanation.
> 
>     >>>* the only possible explanation is Q, that that the referent of 'I'
>     >>>is always self-identical.
> 
>     >>>* but, at [2], -Q is assumed/concluded: the referent of 'I' is never
>     >>>self-identical.
> 
>     >>>* therefore ... what? that your claim to have found the only possible
>     >>>explanation for the unchanged spelling of the english first-person
>     >>>singular pronoun is false?
> 
>     >>I cited Hume's explanation here:
> 
>     >>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033882.html
> 
>     what you 'cited' was a quote from Hume to the effect that the referents
>     of words were constantly changing. how can that possibly help you
>     explain how words can retain the same spelling while their referents
>     change over time?
> 
>  
>  
> Do you see his argument that even if there is NEVER any identity in the referent (i.e., not identity for short spans of time, but rather never any identity whatsoever), that such identity will still be (fictitiously) ascribed when the changes from one moment to the next are not abrupt and sudden (like a house demolished all at once and rebuilt), but gradual and easy (like a house replaced one bit at a time over years until every piece is different)?

Until you address that point, this conversation is over, due to the fact 
that you will certainly (given your past chronic pattern) "forget" that 
I replied to that point.

>  >On 5/5/08, *Joseph Polanik* <jPolanik at nc.rr.com> wrote:
> 
>  >>Professor Crifasi,
> 
>  >>one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition 'I remain
>  >>self-identical throughout all my perceptions' is a necessary condition
>  >>of existence.
> 
>  >>this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
> 
>  >>[1]: P -> Q
> 
>  >>where
> 
>  >>P = 'I exist'  [where 'I exist' = 'I am not nothing']
>  >>Q = 'I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions'
> 
>  >>you also claim that Q is false; so:
> 
>  >>[2]: -Q
> 
>  >>recently, you've argued that you've been misunderstood.
> 
>  >>>>your argument for [1] seems to be that Q is undeniable.
> 
>  >>>I have never said that Q is undeniable. I have only argued that it
>  >>>is a necessary implication of self-existence.
> 
>  >>yes; but, you also say that Q is false; and, you haven't yet come to
>  >>grips with the oddity of having a primary premise, [1] above, that is
>  >>a conditional statement whose consequent is false.
> 
>  >>if the consequent of a condition is false; then, the truth value of
>  >>the conditional as a whole depends on the truth value of the
>  >>antecedent -- in this case 'I exist'.
> 
>  >The truth value of a conditional as a whole is simply the implication
>  >of consequent by the antecedent, regardless of the truth of the
>  >consequent. If the consequent is false, the dependence of the
>  >consequent is not thereby false, but only the antecedent itself.
> 
> not so!
> 
> the truth value of the condition itself is dependent on the truth values
> of the antecedent and consequent --- not the other way around.
> furthermore, the truth value of the condition can be caluclated
> according to the following table:
> 
> Truth Table Values for a Conditional
> 
>       P  -> Q
> [1]  T  T  T
> [2]  T  F  F
> [3]  F  T  T
> [4]  F  T  F
> 
> in the above table (which may not be aligned if you don't get plain
> ASCII email), there are three columns of T's and F's. the first and
> third of these give the truth values of the individual propositions;
> and, the middle column of T's and F's gives the truth value of the
> implication itself.
> 
> with only two propositions, there are exactly 4 combinations of truth
> values for the two propositions. of these, the only one that results in
> a value of 'false' for the implication is condition 2 where a true
> premise implies a false conclusion.
> 
> your premise 2 asserts -Q; meaning, that Q is false. hence, the relevant
> rows in the above table are [2] and [4]. hence the three points made
> previously:
> 
>  >if the antecedent 'I exist' is True then the conditonal is False
> 
>  >if the antecedent 'I exist' is False then the conditonal is Vacuously
>  >True
> 
>  >thus, Professor, your defense of Heidegger is based a premise that can
>  >only be false or vacuous.
> 
> you may want to check out Peter Suber's website on logic at
> http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/log/mat-imp.htm where there is a
> more extended discussion of truth tables. also good is
> http://www.abstractmath.org/MM/MMConditional.htm.