Schizo-Epistemology: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected]

[Anthony Crifasi]

Thanks you for addressing my arguments. My replies to all of them are 
contained in this post.

Joseph Polanik wrote:

>  >>>okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we
>  >>>don't have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the
>  >>>referent of the I that draws the conclusion, 'I have not proven by
>  >>>evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing'.
> 
>  >>>now all we have to decide is whether 'the Nothing' (as defined by
>  >>>Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>  >>>how about it, Anthony, is 'the Nothing' able to assert 'I have not
>  >>>proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing'?
> 
>  >>>if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that
>  >>>skeptical conclusion may legitimately continue, 'it is now a fact
>  >>>that I have just asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and,
>  >>>from that fact (which is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing'.
> 
>  >>>how about it, Professor? is Heidegger's 'Nothing' able to assert 'I
>  >>>have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not
>  >>>nothing'?
> 
>  >>>This was my answer to the above post:
> 
>  >>>http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/joseph-polanik-the-game-player-ii
> 
> nowhere in this post do you actually answer my question concerning the
> Heidegger's 'Nothing'. it's a yes or no question: can the 'Nothing'
> assert 'I am nothing' or 'I am not nothing' or make any other assertion?

The only reason you think that the question you ask is a simple yes or 
no question is, as I have said before, you do not understand Heidegger, 
and are therefore incorrectly citing his "nothing" in this context.

> if not; then, it follows that, if I can make any assertion that the
> Nothing can not make, I may legitimately continue, 'from the fact that I
> can make an assertion the Nothing can not make, I deduce that I am not
> nothing'.
> 
> your post claimed that my argument was based on the First Law of
> Reality, "Nothing unreal is self-aware". however, in my reply (see
> http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/escape-from-the-quagmire-of-sis-3)
> I denied using the First Law of Reality and said my argument was based
> on using the assumption that the First Law of Reality is itself based
> on: the assumption that one may not attribute predicates to nothingness.

And my reply to that 
(http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/escape-from-the-quagmire-of-sis-4) 
was that you gave absolutely no argument for that assumption, and 
therefore accept it totally uncritically. Philosophically, therefore, it 
is no more established than its opposite. I therefore asked you (at the 
link I cite) to argue that assumption, without of course appealing to 
your first law of reality.

> this of course led (over the span of several posts) to an impasse:
> 
> from your premises [1] and [2] above you may conclude -P which would be
> translated 'I do not exist' or 'it is not the case that I am not
> nothing' or 'I am nothing' or some such statement.
> 
> from the assumption that it is not possible to attribute predicates to
> nothingness and the fact of attributing any predicate to I, I conclude
> 'I am not nothing'. for one example out of many possible examples:
> 
> * I experience; therefore, I am capable of experiencing
> 
> * I have attributed a predicate, 'capable of experiencing', to myself;
> therefore, I am not nothing.
> 
> so now we have a contradiction. I conclude P while you conclude -P.

See above regarding the assumption upon which this contradiction depends.

> logically we are now required to reject at least one assumption of the
> set that produces the contradiction; but, of course, we have a choice.
> 
> it seems that you reject the assumption that it is not possible to
> attribute predicates to nothingness, an assumption built into predicate
> logic. however, you won't explicitly admit that you have proved (to your
> own satisfaction) that it is possible to attribute predicates to
> nothingness;

I haven't argued either side (that it is or is not possible). All I have 
said is that you haven't demonstrated that it's impossible. See above.

>  >>>[JP (new material)]:
> 
>  >>>Anthony, you've never addressed the question raised by your claim
>  >>>that your argument applied to all reality types:
> 
>  >>>in the case of the I-3, how do you know either:
> 
>  >>>1. that there is no I-3; or,
> 
>  >>>2. that there is an I-3 and that it is self-identical throughout all
>  >>>its perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die),
>  >>>and so on?
> 
> these three paragraphs are quoted out of context. the context explains
> why the evaluation of the argument must be done once for each reality
> type.
> 
>  >>>My response to the above, as well as your latter question, is here:
> 
>  >>>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033822.html
> 
> I see little to comment on in this post. you avoid answering obvious
> questions by shifting responsibility to your opponent.
> 
> for example,
> 
>  >>>>>I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes' arguments in the First
>  >>>>>Meditation, how again do we "know" that there are any physical
>  >>>>>bodies at all? It's astounding that at this point, after I've cited
>  >>>>>Descartes' First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly
>  >>>>>bring in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.
> 
> I can bring in subscripted pronouns because you've indicated that your
> argument (stated with the ambiguous 'I' of vernacular english) applies
> to all reality types. you have to prove it is true for each type.
> 
> so it is not up to me to address Descartes' First Meditation. it is up
> to you to explain either how we know that there is a physical world
> despite Descartes' doubts or that there is no physical world.

Where on earth did I ever say that we know that? Your citation of I-1 is 
what presupposes such a physical reality. Descartes' First Meditation is 
therefore a direct philosophical challenge to your I-1 reality. My 
argument therefore "applies" to all reality types by undermining your 
assumptions regarding all of them, not by my claiming to know them. Your 
rendition of my argument is utterly mixed up.

> you also seem to have missed the point entirely concerning my use of
> subscripted pronouns to comment on the evidentiary value of certain
> first person statements (I was born, I am now X, I will die). Again,
> since you say that your argument applies to all reality types, the
> ambiguous 'I' becomes a variable. I am able to fill in subscripted
> pronoun of my choice to verify your claims as to that reality type.
> 
> for example, one of your statements, 'I will die', seems to assume that
> you know something important about the I-3: either that there is not I-3
> or that it is mortal rather than immortal. note that I'm not saying
> either that there is or that there is not an I-3. I'm questioning your
> premise that the first person pronoun must always be identical and that
> you never have to deal with the ambiguity as to the reality type of its
> referent.

I'm saying that whichever reality type you choose, you have no evidence 
for underlying identical referent, and therefore have yet to produce any 
explanation whatsoever for why we should always refer to ourselves in 
the first person at all. (e.g., I was born, as opposed to he was born)

>  >>your posts since then support a reconstruction of your argument as
>  >>follows:
> 
>  >>>>* it is a fact that, in english, the first-person singular pronoun
>  >>>>is now and has for centuries been spelled 'I'.
> 
>  >>>>* it is a fact that a given person uses 'I' for self-referencing at
>  >>>>various points in time.
> 
>  >>>>* these two facts must have an explanation.
> 
>  >>>>* the only possible explanation is Q, that that the referent of 'I'
>  >>>>is always self-identical.
> 
>  >>>>* but, at [2], -Q is assumed/concluded: the referent of 'I' is never
>  >>>>self-identical.
> 
>  >>>>* therefore ... what? that your claim to have found the only
>  >>>>possible explanation for the unchanged spelling of the english
>  >>>>first-person singular pronoun is false?
> 
>  >>>I cited Hume's explanation here:
> 
>  >>>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033882.html
> 
>  >what you 'cited' was a quote from Hume to the effect that the referents
>  >of words were constantly changing. how can that possibly help you
>  >explain how words can retain the same spelling while their referents
>  >change over time?
> 
>  >Do you see his argument that even if there is NEVER any identity in the
>  >referent (i.e., not identity for short spans of time, but rather never
>  >any identity whatsoever), that such identity will still be
>  >(fictitiously) ascribed when the changes from one moment to the next
>  >are not abrupt and sudden (like a house demolished all at once and
>  >rebuilt), but gradual and easy (like a house replaced one bit at a time
>  >over years until every piece is different)?
> 
> I can read the argument *Hume* makes; but, I do not know what point
> *Crifasi* is trying to make.
> 
> are you claiming that *Hume* is claiming that, because the house changes
> there is no house?
> 
> are *you* claiming that, because the house changes, there is no house?

I didn't I needed to mention that my citation of Hume's argument against 
you above would indicate that I myself think it to be philosophically 
compelling against your point.

> in post http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/is-it-true-at-all you are
> quoted as saying that you were 'appealing' to "identity of the first
> person pronoun" and you continued by alleging that I "have yet to
> produce any reason whatsoever for the continued identity of the first
> person pronoun if its referent were to lack a continued identity".
> 
> now, of course, I conceed that, in vernacular english, the spelling of
> the first-person pronoun, 'I', has remained unchanged for centuries.
> 
> and therefore what?
> 
> I don't need a reason to acknowledge the empirical fact that, in
> vernacular english, the spelling of the first-person pronoun, 'I', has
> remained unchanged for centuries.

My question was your lack of any explanation for the continued identity 
of the first person pronoun, not about acknowledgment that it has in 
fact remained identical. It is shocking that you made that elementary 
mistake in reading my question above.

> what is your explanation for this empirical fact?
> 
> are you suggesting that the only possible explanation for this empirical
> fact is that the referent of 'I' changes gradually? if not, what *are*
> you claiming;  and, if so, how is that 'explanation' anything other than
> a very unsubtle non-sequitor?

I said that you haven't come up with any other explanation.

> and, in any case, how is this how does
> this supposed explanation for the unchanged spelling of 'I' explain why
> I should conclude 'I am nothing' based on a premise that is either false
> or vacuous?

See below about the "vacuous" criticism.

> while we are on the subject, would you kindly explain what the "identity
> of the first person pronoun" is supposed to mean?

It means that we only refer to ourselves in the first person, not in the 
third and second too. For example, I was born, not he was born. If there 
is no identity in the referent, then you have yet to produce any reason 
for the identity in the pronoun.

> please note especially that I am only conceeding that the spelling of
> the first-person pronoun, 'I', has remained unchanged for centuries ---
> *in vernacular english*.
> 
> obviously, I varied the spelling of the first-person pronoun when
> creating my set of subscripted pronouns to reduce the ambiguity inherent
> in using a single first-person pronoun irregardless of differences of
> opinion as to the reality type of its referent.
> 
> clearly, you are not required to disambiguate by using subscripted
> pronouns; but, if you use some other way, don't you think that
> 'dialectical etiquette' requires you to at least tell us what that way
> is?
> 
> so, that raises other questions that remain unanswered. see
> http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-May/033947.html.
> 
> you've claimed that your argument (premises [1] and [2] above and the
> conclusion 'I am nothing' or 'I do not exist' by modus tollens) applies
> to each of the reality types for which I have defined a subscripted
> pronoun. but you have also claimed
> (http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/joseph-polanik-the-game-player-viii)
> that "Any evidence for your reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically
> impossible".
> 
> okay, so if it is logically impossible for you to have any evidence as
> to reality types 1 and 3 how do you know that premises [1] and [2] are
> true for those reality types?

Because premises 1 and 3 are skeptical arguments against claimed 
knowledge of reality types 1 and 3, not positive claims that reality 
types 1 and 3 actually exist. My premises simply take *your* claims 
about reality types 1 and 3 (i.e., that they are non-phenomenal), and 
use that as premises to undermine your claimed knowledge of them.

> of course you could try the Crifasi Maneuver. you could claim: it is
> logically impossible for there to be evidence that there are entities of
> reality type 1 (physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such
> evidence. the absence of evidence that there is a physical universe is
> evidence that there is no physical universe.

I've shown numerous times that this is a misrepresentation of my 
argument. You are free to search the archives for that.

> however, the Crifasi Maneuver is totally invalid because it is so
> egocentric. someone else could claim it is logically impossible for
> there to be evidence that there are no entities of reality type 1
> (physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such evidence. the
> absence of evidence that there is no physical universe is evidence that
> there is a physical universe.
> 
> so, without using the Crifasi Maneuver, how do you show that premises
> [1] and [2] are true for those reality types?
> 
> as I see it, the only way would be to prove that premises
> [1] and [2] are true for reality type 1 would be to prove one of the
> following:
> 
> 1. there are no physical objects; but, if there were, premises [1] and
> [2] would be true of them.
> 
> 2. there are physical objects; and, premises [1] and [2] are true of
> them.
> 
> given that you've conceeded 

out of curiosity, do you have a degree in philosophy?

> that it is logically impossible to have
> evidence concerning reality types 1 and 3, how do you prove one of those
> two possibilities by evidence based logical deduction?
> 
> and similarly for reality type 3.

 From *your* definition of reality types 1 and 3 as non-phenomenal.

> Truth Table Values for a Conditional
> 
>       P  -> Q
> [1]  T  T  T
> [2]  T  F  F
> [3]  F  T  T
> [4]  F  T  F
> 
> in the above table (which may not be aligned if you don't get plain
> ASCII email), there are three columns of T's and F's. the first and
> third of these give the truth values of the individual propositions;
> and, the middle column of T's and F's gives the truth value of the
> implication itself.
> 
> with only two propositions, there are exactly 4 combinations of truth
> values for the two propositions. of these, the only one that results in
> a value of 'false' for the implication is condition 2 where a true
> premise implies a false conclusion.
> 
> your premise 2 asserts -Q; meaning, that Q is false. hence, the relevant
> rows in the above table are [2] and [4]. hence the three points made
> previously:
> 
>  >if the antecedent 'I exist' is True then the conditonal is False
> 
>  >if the antecedent 'I exist' is False then the conditonal is Vacuously
>  >True

The answer is simple, Joseph:

A vacuous conditional is still true. And if the conditional ("If I
exist, then I remain self-identical") is true, then you cannot question
this self-identity without also questioning your existence, contrary to
your recent attempts to de-link self existence from the necessity for a
self-identical referent for the first person pronoun.

Please address every item in this post.